We analyze whether growth …rms should delay current investment to hoard cash in order to reduce dilution from external …nancing. This hoarding motive is the natural counterpart to saving cash as a precaution to help secure funding for future investment opportunities. However, the two motives lead to fundamentally di¤erent implications for hoarding and for how cash interacts with key …nancial and investment decisions. In particular, our paper contributes to understanding why …rms choosing private over public …nancing hoard less, and why product market competition has an ambivalent impact on the public-private choice.
Introduction
Our knowledge about cash hoarding and investment is mainly framed by a literature that seeks to explain empirical patterns in large and mature …rms. Some of the most important rationales for cash hoarding include building up cash reserves for precautionary or tax reasons (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009) . In this paper, we take a somewhat different perspective: that of a growth …rm with investment opportunities already present, but without the necessary cash to undertake these opportunities-arguably one of the most important settings in corporate …nance. A typical example is a …rm in need of capital to transition from the phase of idea generation and testing to commercialization of this idea at a larger-scale. The relevant question for such a growth …rm is whether it should hoard cash …rst and delay investment to reduce dilution associated with costly external …nancing (by self-…nancing more); or not hoard, accept dilution and invest immediately.
A key insight is that there is a stark di¤erence in predictions depending on whether the driver for hoarding are investment opportunities that are already present or anticipated future investment opportunities. In our setting, in which hoarding means delaying current investment, …rms with better investment opportunities are less inclined to hoard. Intuitively, the opportunity cost of investment delay is increasing in the attractiveness of the opportunities. By contrast, the main prediction in the literature on precautionary hoarding, which considers hoarding prior to the arrival of future investment opportunities, is that such …rms hoard more (Bates et al., 2009 ). In practice, both motives are likely to be important. However, to the extent that …nancial decisions in growth …rms are predominantly shaped by current rather than future investment considerations, the same is likely to apply to hoarding. 1 In this paper, we refer to hoarding that leads to delay of current investment as non-precautionary to highlight its close relation, but also contrast, to its better-known precautionary counterpart.
The fundamental contrast between the two hoarding motives, coupled with the focus on investment timing, could shed light on several puzzling stylized facts that highlight that there are still gaps in our understanding of how hoarding relates to the evolution of growth …rms. For example, it may help explain why …rms choosing private over public …nancing hoard less (Gao et al., 2013; Asker et al., 2015) . This …nding has been di¢ cult to reconcile with the precautionary view that private …rms need to hoard more because of their moreconstrained access to external …nancing (e.g., due to lack of transparency or illiquidity costs). However, this result emerges naturally in our setting. Our analysis also sheds light on the contradictory …ndings that in some studies product market competition increases (Chod and Lyandres, 2011) , while in others it reduces the preference for public …nancing (Chemmanur et al., 2010) . We show that stronger competition can push either direction, depending on its e¤ect on hoarding and investment timing.
We derive our insights in a model in which a growth …rm, run by an owner-manager (henceforth, manager), wants to make a lumpy investment. External …nancing is costly, because external …nanciers have a lower valuation of the …rm's growth opportunity. 2 Hence, the manager considers delaying investment in order to hoard cash to reduce her dependence on external …nancing. To further reduce the …rm's cost of …nance, the manager could make the …rm more transparent. With increasing "transparency"we mean making the …rm open to monitoring and interference by …nanciers, for example, by adjusting its reporting and corporate governance practices. Interference increases …rm value from the …nancier's perspective, but is costly for the manager, as it e¤ectively reduces her autonomy. The trade-o¤ between private and public …nancing that we consider is that public …nancing requires a minimum level of transparency, but has a liquidity bene…t.
The starting point of our analysis is to ‡esh out the contrasting insight (vis-à-vis precautionary theories) that …rms with better investment opportunities hoard less. Based on this insight, we derive predictions for how hoarding interacts with the preferred level of transparency, the …rm's competitive environment, and the choice between public and private …nancing.
Take, …rst, the choice of transparency. We show that when the manager accelerates investment by hoarding less and relying more on external …nancing, she prefers less transparency. The reason is that the manager's stronger reliance on external …nancing gives the …nancier extra incentives to monitor because of his larger stake in the …rm. This increases the likelihood of interference, which the manager could partially counteract by making the …rm less transparent. Though decreasing transparency increases the …rm's funding cost, it is still preferable on balance.
Considering now that both hoarding and the choice between public and private …nancing are endogenous decisions, we show that private …nancing is associated with less hoarding. The reason is that public …nancing has minimum requirements for the …rm's transparency, while private …nancing lets the manager optimally choose the desired level of transparency. This makes private …nancing more attractive for the manager when seeking to limit transparency, which is when she delays and hoards less.
Building on this analysis, we show that product market competition has a dual e¤ect on both hoarding and the …rm's choice between public and private …nancing. Speci…cally, by linking hoarding to investment delay, we highlight that hoarding puts the …rm's …rst-mover advantage at risk. Though this makes hoarding less attractive, there is also a countervailing e¤ect: An increase in competition reduces pro…ts regardless of whether or not the …rm is a …rst-mover. This reduces the opportunity cost of delaying investment and encourages hoarding. Taken together, these countervailing e¤ects imply that competition leads to a reduction of hoarding (in order to accelerate investment) only if having a …rst-mover advantage is of paramount importance. In this case, the …rm aims to invest more quickly, and uses more external …nancing. Given that this invites more monitoring and interference by …nanciers, less transparency (and, thus, private …nancing) becomes preferable to partially counteract the increased scrutiny. Thus, a growth …rm rushing to realize a …rst-mover advantage prefers private …nancing. By contrast, if having a …rst-mover advantage is not of paramount importance, stronger competition leads to more delays and hoarding. The lesser dependence on external …nancing leads to less monitoring and interference, which makes it optimal to lower the cost of funding by choosing more transparency. Public …nancing is now more likely because the minimum transparency requirement of public …nancing is less of a burden. We extend the model along several dimensions. We show that endogenizing the liquidity bene…t of public …nancing (which we take as given in the baseline model) reinforces our results on the choice between public and private …nancing. Furthermore, we consider information asymmetry about the …rm's growth opportunity in addition to the disagreement frictions between the manager and …nanciers. We show that …rms with better investment opportunities will further reduce hoarding to signal quality.
Our results reconcile a number of puzzling empirical …ndings and give rise to novel empirical predictions. First, our model sheds light on Gao et al.'s (2013) and Asker et al.'s (2015) counter-intuitive …ndings that private …rms hoard less than public …rms. We further relate to the evidence that some …rms try to achieve the best of both worlds by being public, but making private placements, which typically have lower transparency requirements. In line with our predictions, such …rms invest more quickly (Phillips and Sertsios, 2017) . Second, our results demonstrate how the public-private choice is a¤ected by product market competition. In particular, the importance of having a …rst-mover advantage determines not only hoarding, but also whether competition leads to more public or more private …nancing. This could help reconcile con ‡icting empirical …ndings, such as those reported in Chod and Lyandres (2011) and Chemmanur et al. (2010) . Indeed, our results on the non-monotonicity between investment delay and competition is consistent with existing empirical evidence (Akdogu and MacKay, 2008) . Overall, our analysis highlights the fundamental di¤erence in predictions depending on whether hoarding is driven by current investment (more likely for growth …rms) or anticipated future investment considerations (more likely for mature …rms).
Our paper mainly relates to the fast growing literature on cash. Firms hoard cash because they may be unable to frictionlessly raise …nancing for new investments. Agency con ‡icts are one such important friction (Jensen, 1986) . 3 Alternatively, …rms may hoard cash as a precautionary measure when anticipating future investment or hedging risk (Tirole, 2006) . Bolton et al. (2011) show that …rms will keep a positive cash balance even if this necessitates costly external …nancing, since the marginal bene…t of avoiding to seize operations is high. In such cases, …rms with stronger cash ‡ow streams need to hoard less (Acharya et al., 2012) . Related, Almeida et al. (2004) show that …nancially constrained …rms save more cash out of cash ‡ows. 4 Existing evidence supports the precautionary motive for hoarding cash (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009 ). However, we are not aware of empirical work investigating the delay of investment due to cash hoarding. In this paper, we argue that this channel is important, as such hoarding has contrasting cross-sectional implications compared to precautionary theories.
By highlighting the key di¤erences in predictions for hoarding depending on whether or not an investment opportunity is already present, our analysis provides novel insights about the endogenous relation between cash hoarding, transparency, competition, and the choice between public or private …nancing. While prior work, such as Boyle and Guthrie (2003) , Hugonnier et al. (2015) , and Bolton et al. (2013) , has analyzed hoarding and investment timing, these broader interactions have been ignored. 5 Earlier contributions relating hoarding to competition have argued that hoarding insures against negative liquidity shocks in order to secure survival (Hoberg et al., 2014; Morellec et al., 2014) . Hoarding is then more important in a competitive environment, leading to an unambiguously positive relationship between hoarding and competition. By contrast, when relating hoarding to investment delay, we show that competition has a dual e¤ect. Specifically, the pressure of competition on future pro…ts makes investment delay and hoarding 3 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) show that cash is worth less when agency problems between inside and outside shareholders are greater, and Nikolov and Whited (2013) identify low managerial ownership as a key factor driving agency costs. In contrast, Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) …nd no evidence relating agency problems to cash holdings. 4 In the context of risk management, Acharya et al. (2013) show that …rms with high aggregate risk exposure prefer cash to credit lines, while Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) argue that the opportunity cost of risk management is higher for constrained …rms. Unlike our focus on …nancing current growth opportunities, these papers focus on cash and/or credit lines as means of overcoming future liquidity problems. Also note that credit lines are not common for growth …rms (Su…, 2009). 5 Interestingly, Chemmanur and He (2011) show that, when going public helps …rms grab market share, a …rm may have incentives to go public to preempt yielding market share to rivals. As in other models analyzing the choice between public and private …nancing (e.g., Pagano and Röell, 1998; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Boot et al., 2008) , there is no cash hoarding in Chemmanur and He's (2011) model. more attractive. However, there is also a force working in the opposite direction, as competition creates incentives to invest more quickly (Grenadier, 2002; Carlson et al., 2006; Novy-Marx, 2007) , which leaves less time for hoarding. These e¤ects di¤er from those in the precautionary literature. Speci…cally, when competition erodes the pro…tability of investments, precautionary hoarding becomes less attractive, while in our case with investment opportunities already present, hoarding incentives go up. Strategic considerations di¤er as well. In our setting, the concern of not being a …rst-mover would drive the manager to reduce hoarding and delay. Instead, with precautionary hoarding as in Lyandres and Palazzo (2015) , the strategic consideration is that a …rm might hoard more to increase its likelihood of being able to invest, and in doing so discourage hoarding and investing by its …nancially constrained competitors.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the relation between hoarding and investment delay and relates it to the choice between private and public …nancing and the e¤ects of competition. In section 4, we analyze various extensions. Section 5 discusses empirical implications. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains all proofs, and the supplementary material in Appendix B discusses a number of further extensions and robustness issues.
Model
Our baseline model features a growth …rm run by a sole owner-manager (henceforth, manager). This …rm already generates revenues, but its potentially main pro…table expansion is still ahead of it. As mentioned, a good example is a …rm that transitions from idea generation and product testing to large-scale production. We model this in the following natural way. Suppose that the …rm has an existing asset in place producing stochastic cash ‡ows. If they are not paid out or invested, these cash ‡ows accumulate in the form of cash reserves. The change of the level of these cash reserves over time follows
where > 0 and 0 are constant and (Z t ) t 0 is a standard Brownian motion. This simple reduced-form formulation for how the level of cash changes within the …rm is su¢ cient for our purposes. A key assumption is that < r, where r is the constant discount rate used by all. This assumption, which is standard in the real options literature, implies that the …rm has only a weak ability to generate cash, and retaining cash ‡ows within it is costly to insiders. This is precisely the feature we want to capture for a growth …rm for which 6 the investment opportunity is the main component of valuation and absent which the …rm constitutes an unpro…table business. At the same time, this setting is su¢ ciently ‡exible to allow us to discuss payout policies and to capture the likelihood of default (because if w t hits zero, the …rm does not recover). 6 Though for most of the main text, we refer to w t as cash, an alternative interpretation is that w t represents the assets the …rm builds up over time, which are available as a safe collateral free of any …nancing frictions. 7 The reason the manager is willing to keep the …rm going is that it has generated a pro…table lumpy investment opportunity, requiring an investment of K and generating cash ‡ows with an expected discounted present value of X. Initially, the manager does not have su¢ cient cash at hand for making the investment, but she has discretion over the timing of the investment. Our approach makes use of the standard real options framework (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), but di¤ers from this framework in one important aspect: the …rm is cash-constrained and the manager may not be able or willing to invest in a positive NPV project even if she has access to outside …nancing. Speci…cally, we assume that at the time at which the manager raises capital to make the investment, she is facing a competitive capital market. However, what makes …nancing expensive for the …rm is that the …nancier and the owner-manager could have di¤erent ideas about the best way to run the …rm, leading the …nancier to undervalue the …rm from the manager's point of view.
To model this, we assume that at t = 0, the manager and the …nancier observe a signal that indicates the project's expected discounted cash ‡ows, with X ( ) > K at least for some and X increasing in . What makes …nancing costly is that, although the …nancier and the manager observe the same signal, they may interpret it di¤erently. The valuation from the manager's perspective is X ( ), while the …nancier believes that there is a probability that the project's value is less than X ( ), so that his overall valuation is only E X ( ). In this expression, 0 1 is the degree of agreement, and E 0 is the …nancier's monitoring intensity that we de…ne below. 8 While we believe di¤erences in vision to be a key reason for di¤erences in valuation of growth …rms, we could interpret 1 alternatively as being 6 The main advantage of (1) is that it allows us to solve most things in closed form. At the cost of losing this tractability, we could specify a cash ‡ow process generating the cash level w t as in Bolton et al. (2013) , but such alternative formulations do not lead to further insights. 7 Examples could include assets like property, plant and equipment, inventories, and accounts receivables, which the …rm accumulates over time. 8 We could derive from primitives by assuming that the …nancier believes that the project's value is X ( ) with probability 0 and aX ( ) otherwise (where 0 a; 0 1). Then = (a + 0 (1 a)). If we had > 1, there would be no hoarding (Proposition 1). Disagreement in a corporate …nance context is usually introduced by postulating heterogeneous priors in the sense of Kurz (1994a,b ), e.g., Boot et al. (2008) . However, disagreement can also arise due to overcon…dence (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; Daniel et al., 1998) , excessive pessimism (Coval and Thakor, 1998) , or optimism (Manove and Padilla, 1999) . caused by limited pledgeability or redeployability of the assets outside the …rm or by the problem that the manager may not be able to commit her human capital to the project (Boyle and Guthrie, 2003) .
All features of our model are common knowledge, and the cash ‡ows and the level of cash are costlessly veri…able. Furthermore, we assume that all parties are risk neutral and protected by limited liability. In our baseline model, we assume that and X ( ) do not change over time, but we relax these assumptions in Appendix B. In that appendix, we also show that the idea of delaying investment to hoard easily extends also to other …nancing frictions.
Transparency and Product Market Competition Given the disagreement between the manager and …nanciers, the manager could make the …rm more transparent in an e¤ort to obtain better …nancing terms. Speci…cally, in analogy to Burkart et al. (1997) , once a …nancier has provided capital and the …rm has invested, the …nancier monitors the …rm and interferes with management with intensity E. Monitoring and interference increases the …rm's value from the …nancier's perspective at a cost to the …nancier of E 2 2 . The parameter re ‡ects the ease of monitoring, determined by the manager's choice of transparency. A higher implies a higher level of transparency and a lower cost of monitoring. Thus, captures the extent to which the …rm's reporting and corporate governance permit outsiders to in ‡uence the way the …rm is run. 9 The reason the manager may choose less transparency is that she perceives …nancier interference as costly, with the cost (E) increasing and convex in the amount of interference E. Speci…cally, we assume that (E) = E 2 2 c, where c > 0. The trade-o¤ between public and private …nancing that we focus on is that public …nancing requires a minimum level of transparency b , while there are no such requirements for private …nancing. On the positive side, public …nancing carries a liquidity bene…t. In our baseline model, this bene…t is exogenous (and in…nitesimal), but we endogenize liquidity considerations in Section 4. We let the choice of the amount and type of …nancing as well as transparency be made together with the investment decision.
The manager's hoarding and …nancing choices are further a¤ected by the …rm's competitive environment. Following Loury (1979) and Weeds (2002), we model competition by assuming that the likelihood that a competitor with a similar idea enters the market before the …rm invests follows an exponential distribution with parameter . The entry parameter 0 < 1 could be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of competition. The impor-tance of competition in our model is that it reduces expected …rm pro…ts. This happens in two ways: an overall reduction in pro…ts regardless of whether the …rm is a …rst-mover, and extra losses in case the …rm becomes a late-mover. Speci…cally, if the …rm is a …rst-mover, the expected value from investment is a fraction F M ( ) 1 of the value without competition, with 0 F M ( ) 0. If a competitor enters before the …rm, the expected value from investment when being a late-mover is a fraction LM ( ) F M ( ) of the value without competition, with again 0 LM ( ) 0. 10 3 The Growth Firm' s Decision to Hoard Cash
(Non-)Precautionary Cash Hoarding and Speed of Growth
To make our …rst point in a simple way, we initially abstract from the choice of transparency and the choice between public and private …nancing and focus exclusively on hoarding and the timing of investment. To do so, we assume that the choice of monitoring and interference is binary E 2 f0; 1g. In this case, the manager can only raise external …nancing if E = 1, which is associated with a …nancier valuation of X. Clearly, in this case, it is optimal for the manager to choose maximal transparency ! 1, as this minimizes the overall cost E 2 2 + K w the …nancier needs to be compensated for, and in turn the manager's cost of …nance. In the next section, we remove the restriction that E is binary, which makes the transparency choice non-trivial. The manager raises K w by selling an equity stake to fund the investment outlay K. Since the market for capital is competitive, the …nancier only requires to break even and the equity stake that needs to be promised to him is (suppressing the dependence of X on ),
The manager's net expected payo¤ at the point in time that she raises K w and co-invests
This payo¤ is increasing in the co-investment w, the pro…tability parameter , and the agreement parameter . We now derive how the potential lack of alignment between management and …nanciers a¤ects the timing (delay) of investment, and in turn the hoarding decision. We solve for the value of the real option to invest using standard dynamic programming methods (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . The problem is that of …nding the optimal level of cash holdings w at which to stop hoarding that maximizes the value of the option to invest U . This involves trading o¤ the bene…t of reducing the funding cost against the time value of money lost from delaying investment, where the manager's expected payo¤ is
Applying Ito's lemma, we obtain
This equation is solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, the manager's expected payo¤ at the time of investment should be equal to her payo¤ from investment:
Second, the manager chooses the investment trigger so as to maximize her value at the endogenous investment threshold: @ @w U (w t ; w ; ) j wt=w = 0. Finally, the option to hoard cash becomes worthless as the value of cash tends to zero:
. Indeed, if the existing business falters (w t ! 0), then it almost surely does not recover (cf. (1)), and the manager can invest only if she raises all …nancing externally. If that is not possible, the …rm has no purpose, and seizes to exist. Using these conditions, we can restate the manager's problem as
where is the positive root of 1 2 2 y (y 1) + y r = 0, and < r implies that > 1.
Intuitively, the right-hand side of expression in (5) can be interpreted as the manager's expected payo¤ from investing at b w multiplied by the probability of reaching the cash level b w and investing. If, disagreement is not so strong, which we de…ne as (5) has no interior solution, and the manager is better o¤ investing immediately. Instead, if disagreement is su¢ ciently strong ( < X (1) K ), solving the optimization problem (5) involves trading o¤ the marginal cost of delay (due to < r) with the potential gains from avoiding dilution by hoarding cash. The value maximizing investment threshold w is given by
For completeness, note that since E is binary, raising external …nancing always entails the monitoring cost (1) > 0 for the manager, implying that she may be better o¤ avoiding external …nancing altogether and hoarding the entire amount K. 11
Proposition 1 If disagreement is su¢ ciently strong ( < X (1) K ), it is optimal for the manager to hoard cash and delay the investment. If raising external …nancing is still optimal, the optimal cash level is given by (6) , and decreases in the quality of the investment opportunity, i.e., @w @ < 0. Furthermore, hoarding increases when there is more disagreement, i.e., @w @ < 0.
Quite naturally, the cost of delay weighs less when there is more disagreement, prompting the manager to hoard more cash. More important, what this proposition points at is that delaying is costlier if the investment opportunity is better. Hence, by building on the simple insight that …rms with better investment opportunities seek to invest more quickly, we obtain that they hoard less cash. The robustness and simplicity of this insight is key. As we show next, it is the exact opposite to what can be expected from precautionary hoarding.
Contrast to Precautionary Hoarding and Discussion Suppose (for this discussion only) that the …rm did not have yet an investment opportunity at t = 0, but expected that such an opportunity may present itself at some future point in time. This is the setting of much of the existing literature where the focus is on precautionary hoarding. To avoid costly delay following the arrival of the investment opportunity, the manager could start hoarding cash prior to its arrival. This would be optimal if the pro…tability of the investment opportunity is su¢ ciently high. Thus, in such a precautionary setting, …rms with better investment opportunities hoard more. In our setting with investment opportunities already present, we have the opposite result: …rms with better opportunities hoard less (Proposition 1).
In practice, both settings are relevant. However, as discussed in the introduction, our model captures the idea that the …nancial and hoarding decisions in growth …rms are mainly determined by current investment needs. By contrast, anticipating future investment needs with precautionary hoarding is more likely to be characteristic for mature …rms.
The hoarding decision further depends on other factors, such as the rate at which the …rm generates cash from existing operations, which might be correlated with the quality of its investment opportunity. Clearly, a higher rate of cash generation would imply more hoarding. Thus, empirical tests need to control not only for a …rm's growth options but also for the pro…tability of its existing assets. It is also possible that scale is adjustable, despite the lumpy nature of the investment opportunity. Here the e¤ect is less clear cut, as the scale decision would depend on whether the investment features increasing or decreasing returns to scale, as well as whether scale can be added in steps. Nevertheless, it continues to hold that, when the …rm's investment opportunity is better, an investment at a given scale is made with a lower proportion of hoarded cash. 12 
Transparency and the Public-Private Choice
We now remove the restriction that E is binary and let the manager choose the level of transparency vis-à-vis external …nanciers. Financiers like transparency as it helps them monitor and interfere. In what follows, we derive the endogenous relation between hoarding and transparency, and then relate the analysis to the choice between public and private …nancing.
Given an equity stake m in the …rm, the …nancier's monitoring choice is given by
resulting in an optimal monitoring level E = m X. 13 Clearly, a larger stake implies more monitoring. Plugging in for E on the right-hand side of (7) to obtain the …nancier's payo¤, his break even condition can be stated as
Since …nanciers compete, this break even condition is satis…ed with equality. Thus, when the …nancier monitors, his equity stake is given by
We can now determine the optimal level of hoarding and transparency by considering the manager's optimization problem. From (8), we see immediately that more transparency decreases the cost of …nance ( @ m @ < 0). However, the trade-o¤ is that more transparency invites more interference by the …nancier, which reduces the manager's payo¤. Speci…cally, the manager's optimal transparency and hoarding decisions solve
where E and m are given by (7) and (8) . We now have:
The manager chooses a lower level of transparency and hoarding if the …rm's investment opportunity is better, i.e., @ @ < 0 and @w m @ < 0.
Key for this result is that the …nancier monitors and interferes more if his stake in the …rm is larger. In analogy to Proposition 1, this occurs when the manager has a better investment opportunity. She is then less willing to delay and, thus, needs more external …nancing, which invites more interference by the …nancier. Such increased scrutiny induces the manager to choose less transparency, which partially mitigates the extra interference. The exact level of transparency balances the impact on the cost of external …nancing with the impact on interference.
We can now use Proposition 2 to understand when public or private …nancing dominates and how it relates to hoarding. Speci…cally, recall that public …nancing comes with a minimum transparency requirement b , while private …nancing puts no such constraints and lets the manager freely choose the desired level of transparency. The latter discretion is more important if the …rm's investment opportunity is better ( is high), as then the manager prefers a lower transparency level (Proposition 2) to partially counteract the …nancier's higher scrutiny. By contrast, if is low, the minimum transparency level b is not constraining, and the manager prefers public …nancing for its liquidity bene…t. Proposition 3 Given a minimum level of transparency requirement b of public …nancing, there is a threshold b , de…ned by ( b ) = b , such that the manager chooses private …nancing for b , and public …nancing otherwise.
Proposition 3 implies that private …nancing is associated with better investment opportunities, less hoarding, and less delay.
An immediate extension to this analysis is to consider private …nancing by …rms that are already public. Speci…cally, new equity issues come with additional disclosure requirements, but these requirements are typically not as stringent for private placements. This can be modeled by assuming that there is an extra transparency obligation dictated by the new issue that can be limited if a private placement is chosen. Since it remains true that …rms with better investment opportunities prefer less interference and hoard (and delay) less, we obtain:
Corollary 1 Growth …rms with better investment opportunities that are already public prefer …nancing sources with lower transparency requirements, such as private placements.
Discussion: Relation to Precautionary Hoarding We have shown that growth …rms with better current investment opportunities are more likely to stay private and hoard less. Extending this result to a setting in which the …rm transitions to precautionary hoarding as it matures would suggest that these …rms e¤ectively delay going public until they mature. Indeed, once growth …rms have matured and hoarding is dictated by anticipated future investment needs rather than current investments, …rms with better future investment opportunities are likely to hoard more and rely less on external …nancing, which makes being public more attractive. The higher transparency requirements of public …nancing are then less cumbersome, as issuing smaller stakes leads to less interference. In general, by making the …rm less dependent on external …nancing, precautionary hoarding is likely to (weakly) increase the preference for public …nancing.
Product Market Competition and the Public-Private Choice
We now relate the choice between public and private …nancing to the …rm's competitive environment. By relating hoarding to investment delay, we show that competition exerts countervailing e¤ects on the incentive to hoard. On the one hand, competition leads to an urgency to accelerate investment and reduce hoarding as a strategic move to preempt the potential loss of the …rst-mover advantage ( F M LM ). This e¤ect is reinforced by the fact that stronger competition not only increases the likelihood of being a late-mover, but also erodes the payo¤s late-movers can make (i.e., 0 LM ( ) 0). Since these two forces work in the same direction, we call them jointly the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect.
On the other hand, stronger product market competition erodes the …rm's pro…tability even it is a …rst-mover (i.e., 0 F M ( ) 0)-call this the …rst-mover erosion e¤ect. Following the intuition of Proposition 1, this second e¤ect implies that stronger competition reduces the opportunity cost of hoarding, which makes hoarding more attractive.
Facing these two countervailing e¤ects, the manager increases investment delay and hoarding in the face of stronger competition if the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect is either not very important or is simply irrelevant, such as when the …rm is a late-mover.
Proposition 4 Stronger product market competition has two countervailing e¤ects: (i) a …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect, which calls for reducing hoarding and speeding up investment; and (ii) a …rst-mover erosion e¤ect, which calls for increasing hoarding and delaying investment. The …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect dominates (and, hence,
su¢ ciently low compared to F M ( ) and 0 F M ( ) (as de…ned in the Appendix). Otherwise, stronger competition increases hoarding (
We can now combine the insights of Section 3.2 with those from Proposition 4. Depending on whether the overall e¤ect of product market competition leads to more or less hoarding and, thus, to a lesser or stronger dependence on external …nancing, we have di¤erent predictions for the choice between public and private …nancing. 14 
Corollary 2
The e¤ect of product market competition on transparency and the choice between public and private …nancing is as follows: (a) If the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect dominates, competition lowers the manager's preferred level of transparency (
, which increases the attractiveness of private …nancing (i.e., b decreases in ). (b) If the …rst-mover erosion e¤ect dominates, competition increases the manager's preference for transparency (
, which increases the attractiveness of public …nancing (i.e., b increases in ).
Corollary 2 shows that competition can a¤ect the choice between public and private …nancing by a¤ecting the …rm's choice of hoarding investment delay. Before continuing with the model's extensions, we brie ‡y relate again to the precautionary hoarding motive. Studying the e¤ect of competition on this motive, Hoberg et al. (2014) and Morellec et al. (2014) argue that, by compressing margins, competition reduces the capacity of …rms to deal with liquidity shocks and would, thus, increase the need for precautionary hoarding. Incorporating this prediction into our setting would mean that the preference for public …nancing (weakly) increases. 15 
Extensions and Robustness
In this section we discuss extensions and robustness issues. In Section 4.1, we expand on the liquidity bene…t that we have associated with public …nancing and how it is related to the choice of transparency and the intensity of monitoring interference. Subsequently, in Section 4.2, we introduce asymmetric information and study its e¤ect on hoarding. 16 
Liquidity and the Public-Private Choice
In our analysis of the choice between public and private …nancing, we assumed that public …nancing has a (in…nitesimal) liquidity bene…t. This bene…t served as a tie breaker, inducing the manager to choose public …nancing when not burdened by its minimum transparency requirements. We will now expand on the liquidity bene…t and analyze its relation to transparency and monitoring.
What we see as liquidity bene…t of public …nancing is that it is easier to …nd …nanciers in public markets. Speci…cally, suppose that, after funding the project and interfering, the …nancier may encounter a liquidity shock with probability q, in which case he needs to sell his stake in the …rm to a new …nancier with a potentially lower valuation. We let the new …nancier's expected valuation be a fraction of that of the initial …nancier. Thus, when buying a stake , the initial …nancier values this stake at (1 q + q ) E X. We stipulate that under public …nancing, = pub = 1 (i.e., a liquidity shock is not costly for the …nancier), while under private …nancing = priv < 1.
In analogy to Section 3.2, the …nancier's monitoring level is E = m (1 q + q ) X, and his break even condition ((1 q + q ) m X) 2 2 K w will be satis…ed with equality, resulting in an equity stake of
Observe that greater liquidity (higher ) has some similarity to a more aligned valuation (higher ), which lowers the cost of external …nancing. Thus, if under public …nancing, the manager would optimally choose > b , it is a clear-cut decision to choose public …nancing. However, if the manager's optimal transparency choice under public …nancing is below b , she faces a trade-o¤ between receiving a higher valuation from …nanciers (in case of public …nancing) and being able to optimally set the …rm's transparency level (with private …nancing).
The main insight here is that, while the marginal bene…t of liquidity is the same for every dollar of external …nancing, the marginal cost of interference to the manager increases in the amount of external …nancing she wants to raise. When the manager seeks to raise more external …nancing, she faces more monitoring and interference, which she would like to partially o¤set by choosing less transparency. This may not be possible with public …nancing given its minimum transparency requirement. As a result, the higher the quality of the …rm's investment opportunity , the bigger the gap between the transparency requirement of public …nancing and the transparency level preferred by the manager. Thus, as in Proposition 3, we obtain that there is a threshold b l , such that the manager prefers public …nancing if and only if is below b l .
Proposition 5 Consider a model extension in which public …nancing makes reselling equity stakes easier. The manager chooses public …nancing if and only if < b l , and private …nancing otherwise.
Discussion: Free Rider Problems A related issue is that …nanciers in public markets might be passive due to free rider problems. Speci…cally, if the manager raises equity from multiple …nanciers, no single investor might have incentives to monitor, or with a large …nancier being present, that large …nancier might monitor while others are freeriding. Allowing for such behavior does not change the main insights. Since monitoring and interference increase …rm value from the …nanciers' perspective, the liquidity in public markets would facilitate that passive (small) …nanciers sell their shares to a (large) …nancier who does all the monitoring. Thus, the manager would still choose public …nancing only if interference is less likely to be a big burden. 17 
Can Cash Hoarding Reveal Growth Prospects?
Sofar, the friction between the outside …nancier and the manager was limited to disagreement about whether the value of the investment opportunity is X ( ) or X ( ). We now also consider the possibility that the manager is better informed about the signal . We will show that the manager's hoarding choice mitigates this problem, as it helps convey valuable information to …nanciers regarding the …rm's growth prospects. 18 To convey the main idea, we abstract from the transparency choice by assuming again that monitoring is binary, i.e., E 2 f0; 1g, in which case the manager can raise outside …nancing only if E = 1 and her transparency choice is trivial ( ! 1). We introduce asymmetric information by making the parameter privately known to the manager, but not to …nanciers. It is common knowledge that is drawn from a CDF F on [ ; ]. This gives rise to a game of signaling, in which the manager signals her type through her choice of hoarding.
An equilibrium candidate in pure strategies for the signaling game can be characterized with a triple of functions (w ; ; ), where w is the cash level that a manager of type chooses as target for hoarding;
is the …nancier's posterior belief that maps w into the set of probability distributions over the type set 2 ; ; 2 [0; 1] is the equity stake o¤ered by the …nancier in return for funding K w . In a competitive market for capital, this stake is such that the …nancier breaks even for his posterior believes. Our equilibrium concept is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Summarizing, the manager maximizes (4) subject to the condition that the proposed contract is individually rational for a …nancier who makes zero pro…t and who uses Bayes rule on the equilibrium path to form his posterior beliefs when drawing an inference b about the …rm's type. We assume pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs that assign probability one to the lowest type if the …nanciers observe an o¤-equilibrium hoarding level.
In a separating equilibrium of the resulting game, the proposed contract must be incentive compatible. More formally, suppose that there is a monotonic di¤erentiable function w , which outside …nanciers use to infer the manager's type given her choice of investment threshold. Then, if the manager decides to exercise at b w 2 w ; , outside …nanciers infer that the type is b = w 1 ( b w) and the manager's expected payo¤ is
which generalizes (5) . Since the investment decision must be on the optimal path, w solves:
where, assuming that a separating equilibrium exists, we evaluate the respective …rst-order
This problem is well-behaved. Lemma A.1 in the Appendix shows that single crossing with respect to cash hoarding holds. Intuitively, while hoarding helps to reduce the dependence on external …nancing, it is costly (as < r) and …rms with better investment opportunities face higher costs of delay than …rms with worse investment opportunities. At any level of hoarding and for all beliefs b , a manager with a better investment opportunity would gain more (or lose less) from reducing hoarding. Hence, delaying is most costly for good types.
Consider now the following equilibrium candidate. The lowest type chooses the same hoarding level as under symmetric information, i.e., w ( ) = w ( ). Intuitively, there is no reason for the lowest type to distort its hoarding policy, given that no type has an incentive to pretend being the lowest type. Higher types choose a hoarding level w ( ) < w ( ), de…ned by the …rst-order condition (10), evaluated at w 1 ( b w) = . The reason the manager needs to distort her hoarding policy downward relative to the case with symmetric information is to avoid being mimicked by lower types. Indeed, the single crossing condition guarantees that such downward deviations can make mimicking prohibitively costly for lower types. We verify in the Appendix that such a separating equilibrium exists and is unique if K X( ) . If the latter condition does not hold, there is still a continuum of semi-separating equilibria in which higher types hoard (weakly) less than lower types. Proposition 6 (i) A su¢ cient condition for a unique fully separating equilibrium is that K X( ) . In this equilibrium, better types separate from lower types by hoarding and delaying investment less. There is less hoarding than under symmetric information: w ( ) w ( ) with the inequality being strict for all > . (ii) Regardless of whether K X( ) holds, there is a continuum of semi-separating equilibria in which higher types hoard (weakly) less than lower types.
Empirical Implications
We conclude with a discussion of the main empirical implications stemming from our model. Our innovation is to ask: If growth …rms have investment opportunities present, but not the funds to …nance them, will they delay investment and hoard cash to reduce dependence on external …nancing? And how does this hoarding motive interact with other …nancial decisions such as the choice between public and private …nancing? Surprisingly, the literature has overlooked that analyzing hoarding with investment opportunities present (focus on current investment) leads to very di¤erent predictions when compared to the much-analyzed case of precautionary hoarding, i.e., hoarding driven by future investment opportunities. As emphasized earlier, we believe that our setting better describes growth …rms. For mature …rms, precautionary hoarding motivated by anticipated future investment needs may be the more relevant description.
Our starting point is to show that …rms with better investment opportunities will hoard less. The intuition is as simple as it is robust: Once investment opportunities have arrived, delaying investment to avoid dilution is costlier if the opportunities are better (Proposition 1).
Implication 1
Growth …rms with better current investment opportunities at hand hoard less, i.e., such …rms invest with a higher proportion of external …nancing, as they want to minimize investment delay. Implication 1 provides a sharp contrast with the insights from a precautionary hoarding perspective that …rms with better future opportunities hoard more. Thus, our analysis implies that cash hoarding is very much dependent on the …rm's life-cycle phase. Growth …rms with better investment opportunities follow a low cash strategy in their growth phase (in the sense that they invest with a higher proportion of external …nancing), even though they might end up cash rich as they mature. This life-cycle pattern …nds support in Drobetz et al. (2015) .
One of the innovations of our paper is to study the interaction of hoarding with the choice between public and private …nancing. The key driver for this choice is that public …nancing dictates a minimum level of transparency, which encourages monitoring and interference. Since …rms with substantial external …nancing (low hoarding) would be particularly exposed to interference, they may choose to partially mitigate this by opting for private …nancing in combination with less transparency (Proposition 3). With such self-selection, one may observe that private …rms are more closely monitored than public …rms. However, this is misleading, because a …rm choosing private …nancing would have faced even higher scrutiny with public …nancing. Hence, taking into account that both hoarding and the public-private choice are endogenous decisions, we show that …rms choosing private …nancing delay current investments less and hoard less (Proposition 3). 19 Implication 2 A growth …rm in a position to choose between public and private …nancing (i.e., for which the …nancing choice is an endogenous decision) delays current investment less and hoards less when choosing private …nancing. Implication 2 …nds strong support in a recent empirical study by Gao et al. (2013) that explicitly takes into account the endogeneity of the choice between public and private …nancing. It shows that public …rms hoard up to twice as much cash as comparable private …rms. Further in line with our theory, Asker et al. (2015) …nd that private …rms not only have less cash, but also react more quickly to new growth opportunities. 20 In a similar vein, some …rms may wish to gain the best of both worlds (Corollary 1) by being public, but choosing private placements when their investment opportunities are better (Gomes and Phillips, 2012; Phillips and Sertsios, 2017). Implication 3 captures this Implication 3 For a …rm that is already public, choosing private …nancing (e.g., a private placement) would go hand-in-hand with less hoarding and delay.
It is important to stress that Implication 2 may look di¤erent for mature …rms, for which hoarding seeks to address future investment needs, i.e., precautionary hoarding. For such …rms, anticipated better future investment opportunities would stimulate hoarding and reduce the subsequent reliance on external …nancing. This would increase the attractiveness of public …nancing. Applying our insights to a life-cycle prediction tracking a growth …rm to maturity, we expect (following Implication 2) better …rms to rely more on external …nancing in the growth phase which dictates private …nancing and delaying public …nancing. Yet in the subsequent more mature phase, precautionary hoarding kicks in, and better …rms would be willing to go for public …nancing. Implication 4 Firms with better current investment opportunities wait to go public until they mature, at which stage hoarding is mainly driven by future investment opportunities. 21 Another novel insight of our model concerns the interaction of competition, hoarding, and the choice between public and private …nancing. Consider, …rst, the e¤ect of competition on hoarding. The prior literature on cash and competition has not focused on investment delay. By allowing for delay of current investment opportunities, the …rst e¤ect of competition that we consider is that hoarding makes it more likely that the …rm loses a …rst-mover advantage related to such opportunities. We show that this e¤ect would call for speeding up investment and less hoarding, which would favor private …nancing. However, we also show that competition could have the opposite e¤ect: If securing a …rst-mover advantage becomes less important, competition will lead to less hoarding and will favor public …nancing. This is because, by reducing pro…tability, competition makes hoarding more attractive (Corollary 2).
Implication 5
The e¤ects of stronger product market competition are as follows: (i) If having a …rst-mover advantage is of paramount importance for a growth …rm, it prefers private …nancing, as such …nancing is more attractive if the …rm reacts to competition by lowering hoarding and delaying current investment less. (ii) By contrast, public …nancing is preferable if product market competition signi…cantly erodes the pro…tability even for …rstmovers.
Implication 5 is consistent with …ndings documenting a U-shaped relationship between competition and investment delay (Akdogu and MacKay, 2008) . In particular, an explanation consistent with our model is that an increase in competition in highly concentrated industries makes securing a …rst-mover advantage more important, leading to an acceleration of investment. By contrast, …rst-mover considerations are less relevant in already competitive industries. Thus, an increase in competition mainly leads to a further erosion of pro…tability and a slowdown in investment. Based on such evidence, we expect a corresponding U-shaped relation between competition and hoarding. The di¤erential e¤ect predicted by Implication 5 could further help explain why some empirical studies …nd that stronger product market competition leads to more public …nancing (Chod and Lyandres, 2011) while others …nd the opposite (Chemmanur et al., 2010) . 22 We conclude this section by noting that testing these predictions would require carefully controlling for a number of factors. As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, empirical tests would have to control for the pro…tability of the …rm's assets in place and the …rm's investment scale. Furthermore, recall that our predictions are about the fraction of hoarded cash (relative to external …nancing) used by the …rm to …nance any given investment outlay and how this depends on the …rm's growth prospects. In particular, these predictions do not easily translate into predictions for cash-to-assets ratios, as, trivially, …rms with more investment opportunities would mechanically hoard more cash. 23 Thus, empirical tests of our predictions may want to focus on exogenous shocks a¤ecting the value of already existing investment opportunities. Controlling for the …rm's stage of development is also important, as we expect that our predictions will apply less well for mature …rms, for which precautionary hoarding might be a better description. A further empirical challenge would be to take into account that infrequent balance sheet data might not capture the dynamics of hoarding and building up cash …rst, and then using the hoarded cash to invest. Furthermore, better growth …rms will more quickly make the transition to becoming mature and cash rich as a sign of their success. For such …rms the precautionary motive might more quickly become a better description. As emphasized, the hoarding predictions would then be the opposite. Finally, it would be important to consider non-linear e¤ects, in particular for the predicted U-shaped relationship between competition and cash.
Conclusion
We develop a theory that analyzes whether a growth …rm will choose to delay investments in order to hoard cash and depend less on outside …nancing. Our perspective is one where investment opportunities are already present, but funding is not. This perspective is of primary importance for growth …rms, but surprisingly ignored in the literature, which has largely focused on hoarding in anticipation of a future investment opportunity. The distinction is far from trivial, as the two types of hoarding have very di¤erent implications.
In our model, entrepreneurs try to avoid external …nancing because they are reluctant to see their stake diluted. Our starting point is to show that …rms with better investment opportunities hoard less and …nance a higher fraction of new investments with outside …nancing. The key reason is that they …nd it more costly to delay a more pro…table opportunity. By comparison, in a precautionary setting, …rms hoarding cash in anticipation of the arrival of future investment opportunities, hoard more when these prospects are better. Thus, the cross-sectional predictions are the opposite. Expanding on this simple insight, we show a number of novel results that question the extent to which standard arguments developed for mature …rms (focusing on precautionary hoarding) apply to growth …rms that seek to satisfy immediate funding needs for investment opportunities at hand.
One of our main insights is that …rms with better opportunities are more likely to go for private …nancing. The reason is that these …rms depend less on internally generated cash and more on external …nancing, which encourages monitoring and interference by …nanciers. With private …nancing, this interference can be managed by lowering transparency, contrary to public …nancing, which has minimum levels of mandatory transparency.
Another prediction is that product market competition can have opposing e¤ects on hoarding and the choice between public and private …nancing. One e¤ect is that competition gives …rms an incentive to accelerate investment to hold on to their …rst-mover advantage. This leaves less time for hoarding. However, there is a countervailing e¤ect, which could easily dominate: competition is likely to reduce pro…tability regardless of whether or not the …rm is a …rst-mover. Investment is then less lucrative, making delay less costly and hoarding more attractive. Combining these insights with our results on public versus private …nancing, we predict that, when product market competition strongly erodes pro…ts and drives …rms to delay and hoard more cash, …rms are more likely to raise public …nancing. Alternatively, if product market competition leads …rms to accelerate investment, it will reinforce the bene…t of raising private …nancing Several extensions of our model yield further insights into how cash hoarding a¤ects the evolution of growth …rms. In particular, we show that introducing asymmetric information leads to less hoarding. This is because hoarding conveys a signal about the …rm's prospects, which induces …rms to choose less hoarding in order to signal better prospects.
Our results further provide insights on the dynamics of …rm evolution and cash holdings. Our analysis focuses on growth …rms that are short on cash and operate in an uncertain environment. The ones with better investment opportunities will choose to grow rapidly using outside funding, and, relative to their lesser peers, will be cash-poor. However, on average, they will be more pro…table and successful. This implies that in the follow-up stage after these …rms have established themselves, they may start earning cash at a higher rate than needed for investment and growth. High cash holdings are then a sign of past success. This would imply that growth …rms striving to become the next Google, Microsoft, or Apple should not try copying the large cash holdings of these already mature …rms; as growth …rms they should hoard little to realize more quickly current investment opportunities. 24 Another implication is that since …rms with better opportunities also invest more rapidly, reinforcing e¤ects are present. The result resembles an accelerated Darwinian survival process with "winners taking it all." 
Appendix A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to b w we obtain
The …rst term shows the time-value-loss of waiting for w to increase, while the second term shows the bene…t from obtaining cheaper …nancing when increasing the co-investment. Note that since > 1, expression (A.1) is negative if > X (1) K . In this case, hoarding cash is never optimal. Hence, the manager only hoards cash if the disagreement with the …nancier is su¢ ciently strong and X
(1) K . Then, the …rst-order condition (FOC) yields:
For completeness, note that the second order condition is
At the interior optimum (when the FOC holds), which is the case when X < K, the second line is zero, and the expression is negative. Clearly, if the initial cash at hand is w 0 > w , the manager invests immediately. Observe now that w decreases in . Furthermore, w decreases in , as w decreases in X and X increases in . Finally, observe that, since (1) > 0, the manager's expected payo¤ (5) when hoarding (6) needs to be compared to her payo¤ when she hoards all of K. That is, the manager hoards w if
and otherwise hoards K. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using that m = p 2 (K b w) X from (8), the manager's payo¤ in (9) can be stated as
We derive, …rst, the conditions characterizing the optimal level of hoarding w m and transparency (Step 1). Then, we show that for the so optimally chosen w m and , …rms with better growth prospects choose less transparency and less hoarding (Step 2). For use below, observe that E (w; ) = m X = p 2 (K w).
Step 1. The optimal level of transparency is given by the …rst-order condition of (A.3) with respect to
where the subscripts of U denote partial derivatives. The second-order condition is
where the second equality follows after plugging in from the …rst-order condition (A.4) that at the optimal choice of transparency, we must have @ (E) @E = 1 , and using that @ 2 (E) @E 2 0. Evaluating the cross-partial @ 2 V A @ b w@ at the optimal transparency level, = , we further
where the last equality follows after using that at the optimal choice of transparency , the …rst line of (A.6) is zero and we must have again that @ (E) @E = 1 . Hence, the manager chooses more transparency when hoarding more.
Similar to Proposition 1, the optimal hoarding level, w , is de…ned by the …rst-order condition of (9) with respect to b w
The …rst-order conditions (A.4) and (A.7) de…ne the necessary conditions for local maxima.
A su¢ cient condition is that at these points U < 0 (which holds by (A.5)), U b w b w < 0 and
A limit to our closed-form analysis is that
w cannot be signed in general. However, we have veri…ed numerically that there are wide parameter ranges for which these conditions are satis…ed and, thus, for which an interior solution for w and exists. In what follows, we limit attention to these cases. The comparative statics when there is no interior solution (i.e., w m is zero or K) are trivial.
Step 2. From the …rst-order conditions (A.4) and (A.7), we can apply standard comparative statics arguments to obtain that, when interior solutions for w m and exist, then at the optimal hoarding and transparency levels it must hold
As noted above, we limit attention to the cases in which U , U b w b w < 0, and H > 0. We have shown in (A.6) that U b w > 0 at w m and . Furthermore
Using that @ (E) @X = @ 2 (E) @E@X = 0 to sign (A.10) and (A.11), we obtain that both (A.8) and (A.9) are negative, implying that and w m decrease in X. In turn, since X increases in , the optimal transparency choice and hoarding level decrease in . 25 Finally, for completeness, observe that from the …rst-order condition (A.4), we have
:
Hence, the …nancier's interference is given by
, which is decreasing in w m . Since w m decreases in , the …nancier's interference increases in (i.e., though a higher leads to choosing less transparency, this does not fully o¤set the increased willingness to monitor and interfere). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 2, we have that the optimal transparency level ( ) decreases in . Hence, there is a value b , de…ned by ( ) = b , such that for values b the manager would optimally choose < b , making the minimum transparency level b suboptimally high for these types. For values < b , this level is not binding and the manager prefers public …nancing for its liquidity bene…t. As noted, we endogenize this bene…t in Section 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in two steps. It starts by showing that if the …rm could still enjoy a …rst-mover advantage, the manager hoards less cash than she would 25 Our analysis could be extended to the case in which the manager's cost of interference increases in X by assuming that (E) = E 2 2 cX. To see this, note that @ 2 (E) @ @X > 0 , so that (A.10) is negative, and that the cross-partial corresponding to (A.11) can be stated as
with the last equality following from the …rst-order condition (A.7).
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hoard if the …rm had lost the …rst-mover advantage (Step 1). Then, it shows that stronger competition exerts a dual e¤ect on hoarding incentives if the …rm has not lost yet the …rstmover advantage (Step 2). We proceed as before by solving …rst for the binary monitoring case in which E = 1; and extend the analysis to continuous monitoring and interference for the discussion of public and private …nancing (Corollary 2).
Step 1. Let w LM denote the …rm's optimal hoarding level if it is a late-mover. In this case, the manager's expected payo¤ can be derived analogously to Proposition 1 as
where for notational simplicity we suppress in what follows the dependence of F M and LM on the competition variable . By the same arguments as Proposition 1, we have that
Let w F M be the manager's optimal cash hoarding level while still being a potential …rstmover. In what follows, we argue to a contradiction that w F M w LM . Suppose not. If w LM < w F M , we have two cases, depending on whether the manager would optimally invest immediately if the …rm loses the …rst-mover advantage (given the cash she has hoarded by then). Given that the likelihood of this occurring follows an exponential distribution with parameter , applying Ito's lemma modi…ed for jump processes we have
If w LM w w F M , the manager's expected payo¤ takes the form A 1 w 1 + B 1 w 2 + C 1 w + D 1 , where 1 and 2 are the positive and, respectively, negative root of (r + ) y 
If, instead, w w LM w F M , then the manager's expected payo¤ takes the form A 2 w 1 + B 2 w 2 + C 2 w . Since the option value of investing is zero for w ! 0, we must have B 2 = 0.
Furthermore, using (A.14) to derive C 2 , we have
Finally, we can obtain A 2 and B 1 from the value matching condition U F M 1 (w LM ) = U F M 2 (w LM ), and the smooth pasting condition @ @w U F M 1 (w) j w=w LM = @ @w U F M 2 (w) j w=w LM . In particular, expressing A 2 from the value matching condition and plugging it into the smooth pasting condition, we obtain B 1 after some reformulations as
where the …rst inequality (in the second line) follows from LM F M ; the second equality (in the third line) follows after plugging in for B 1 and using that from w LM = 1 K ( F M X (1)) 1 , we can replace K ( LM X (1)) with w LM (1 ) 1 ; the second inequality (in the fourth line) follows from the contradiction assumption that w F M > w LM ; the last inequality follows from the fact that 1 1 r r+
is negative (as it is zero for = 0 and decreasing in ) and 1 > w F M w LM 2 (as 2 < 0). Thus, we obtain a contradiction, so we must have that w F M w LM .
Step 2. We now analyze the e¤ect of on w F M . Since w w F M w LM , the manager's expected payo¤ takes the form Aw 1 + Bw 2 + Cw . We have again B = 0, since the option to invest is zero for w ! 0, and it can be veri…ed that
where plugging in from (A.13), w F M is the solution to the …rst-order condition
By standard monotone comparative statics arguments, the e¤ect of an increase in competition on hoarding is given by the sign of the cross partial
w F M @ , which after some transformations becomes
The …rst line of (A.15) is negative, as the delay associated with hoarding reduces the likelihood of being a …rst-mover. For any given b w F M , the …rst line of (A.15) is lower if LM (and so U LM ) is lower. Furthermore the term 1 1 @ LM @ w w LM in the second line of (A.15) is also negative. This term captures that the reduced late-mover pro…tability increases the loss of not being a …rst-mover and puts further pressure to reduce hoarding. To see this, note that the cross partial
> 0 captures the e¤ect of losing the …rst mover advantage on hoarding (lower LM leads to more hoarding) and that @ @ 0. Together, this two e¤ects comprise the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect. The lower LM and @ LM @ , the stronger is the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect.
The …rst-mover erosion e¤ect is captured by the term @ F M @ 0 in the second line. This e¤ect is positive and creates incentives to increase hoarding. This e¤ect works in the opposite direction to @ LM @ 0 in the second line, and is strengthened by the fact that 1 1 is less than one. Summarizing, the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect dominates if LM and @ @ ( LM ) are su¢ ciently low to make (A.15) negative. Then, cash hoarding decreases in competition. Otherwise, if the …rst-mover erosion e¤ect ( @ F M @ 0) dominates, competition increases hoarding. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose now that E is a continuous choice. In analogy to the proof of Proposition 2, the manager's expected payo¤ as a late-mover is
Furthermore, based on the proof of Proposition 4, one can verify that the manager's expected payo¤s as a …rst-mover is given by 26
Further analogous to Proposition 2, the sign of @ LM @ is the same as that of @ 2 U LM
w LM @ , and the sign of
@w LM @ > 0, we have @ LM @ > 0, i.e., competition leads late-movers to choose more transparency. However, if the …rm can still be a …rst-mover, then, just as in (A.15), the sign of
depends on the importance of having a …rst-mover advantage. If the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect is dominated by the …rst-mover erosion e¤ect (i.e., @ 2 U F M @ b w F M @ > 0), we have @ F M @ > 0. Then, stronger competition makes higher transparency optimal. Relating to the cuto¤ b , implicitly de…ned by ( b ) = b , this implies that b increases in , i.e., public ownership becomes more attractive for a wider range of . By contrast, if the …rst-mover bene…t e¤ect dominates (i.e.,
Then, b decreases in , i.e., stronger competition makes private ownership more attractive for a wider range of . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let p pub = 1 q + q pub and p priv := 1 q + q priv . Since pub = 1, we have that p pub = 1 under public …nancing. The manager's expected payo¤s under public and private …nancing, respectively, are 17) where we plug in for (E) = E 2 2 c = (K w) c; and where w pub , w priv , pub , and priv are the optimal hoarding and transparency levels under public and private …nancing. In analogy to Proposition 2, these levels decrease in , with public ownership involving the additional restriction that pub b . Applying the Envelope theorem, we see immediately that
implying that the sign of (A.18) is the same as that of w priv w pub . Furthermore, since the manager's expected payo¤ increases in p, public …nancing (with p = 1) is always preferable if pub b is not binding. In what follows, we abstract from the extreme cases in which either only public or only private …nancing is optimal for all values of . Since pub decreases in (see Proposition 2), pub b is not binding and, thus, public ownership is preferable for low values of . Let b l be a value of for which the preference changes from public to private …nancing. At this point, it must hold that @ @ U pub U priv < 0. Thus, from expression (A.18), we must have that w priv < w pub .
Finally, we show that w priv < w pub whenever the manager chooses private …nancing. Suppose not. Take the lowest value 0 > b l , for which an increase in changes the manager's preference from private to public …nancing. From expression (A.18), for 0 it must hold w priv > w pub . Hence, for all 2 ( b l ; 0 ), we have U priv U pub (by construction), but for some in this interval, we have w priv < w pub , while for others w priv w pub . In particular, by (upper hemi-) continuity of w priv and w pub , there is a value 00 2 ( b l ; 0 ) for which w priv = w pub . At this value 00 , the inequality 0 U priv (w; w priv ) U pub (w; w priv ) can be stated as
(A. 19 ) where note that, whenever U priv U pub , b must be binding in case of public …nancing. In fact, we must also have b priv . Suppose not and priv > b . However, then for the transparency level priv , the manager would not be constrained by the minimum requirements of public …nancing, but would e¤ectively receive a higher valuation for the …rm (cf. (A. 16) and (A.17)), implying also a higher payo¤ than with private …nancing. This contradicts that U priv > U pub for 2 ( b l ; 00 ). The derivatives of U priv and U pub with respect to the optimal hoarding level, evaluated at w priv , are
Subtracting (A.21) from (A.20), we obtain
Together, conditions (A. 19 ) and (A.22), can only be satis…ed if
These inequalities require that p priv q priv > q b , contradicting b priv , which we established above. Q.E.D.
Before proving Proposition 6, we start by showing a useful result.
Lemma A.1 Single crossing holds because
where b is the …nancier's inference about the …rm's type .
Proof of Lemma A.1. Plugging into the LHS of Expression (A.23), we obtain
Proof of Proposition 6.
Step 1: Characterizing fully separating equilibria To show existence of a separating equilibrium, we follow standard arguments. Rewriting (10), we obtain
Taking the FOC and assuming that a separating equilibrium exists, i.e., w 1 ( b w) = , we have
To solve this equation we need the appropriate boundary condition. Since no type has an incentive to mimic the lowest type, we can set: w = w , where w is obtained from expression (6) for = . For all out-of-equilibrium hoarding levels w 6 2 w ; w ( ) , we stipulate that the …nancier assigns probability one to the lowest type . We verify below when the conditions for Theorems 1-3 in Mailath (1987) are satis…ed. If these conditions are satis…ed, there is a unique (up to the out-of-equilibrium beliefs) separating equilibrium in which w is continuous and di¤erentiable, satis…es (A.25), and
has the same sign as @ 2 @ b w@ U (w t ; b w; b ; )). We now show that w < w in such a separating equilibrium. To see this, rewrite (A.25) as
Compare (A.26) to the optimality condition (A.1) in Proposition 1. The RHS of (A.26) is positive, while it is zero absent information asymmetry. Thus, taking into account that the LHS decreases in w , we must have w < w .
Step 2: Verifying Mailath's (1987) conditions Mailath's (1987) regulatory conditions are:
) is either strictly positive or strictly negative. 3) Type monotonicity:
) is either strictly positive or strictly negative. 4) Strict quasiconcavity: @ @ b w U (w t ; b w; ; ) = 0 has a unique solution in w that maximizes U ( ) j b = , and @ 2 @ b w 2 U ( ) j b = < 0 at this solution. 5) Boundedness: There is k > 0 such that for all ( ; w) 2 ;
[0; K], @ 2 @ b w 2 U ( ) j b = 0 implies @ @ b w U ( ) b = > k. Note that we restrict attention to w 2 [0; K], as the manager has no need of external …nancing if w > K.
Conditions 1)-2) are satis…ed. Proposition 1 shows that condition 4) is also satis…ed. To check for condition 5), observe that if @ 2 @ b w 2 U ( ) j b = 0, then since the …rst line of the second-order condition (A.2) is negative, we must have @ @ b w U ( ) j b = < 0. Thus, we can …nd a k that satis…es condition 5.
Finally, we check when @ 2 @ b w@ U ( ) < 0 holds (i.e., condition 3). We have
Since w ( ) is lowest for type , while X is lowest for , it would be su¢ cient that w > w := 1 (K X( )) ; (A. 27) which is always satis…ed if X( ) K. Note that since the …nancier attributes a deviation to a lower cash hoarding strategy to the lowest type, a deviation is unpro…table for all types.
Step 3: semi-separating Equilibria If, instead, X( ) < K and if the fully separating equilibrium cannot be supported (note that (A.27) is su¢ cient, but not necessary), we can still construct a continuum of semiseparating equilibria in which hoarding (weakly) decreases in the manager's type. In what follows, we brie ‡y sketch one such equilibrium: (i) types ( 0 ; ] pool at w P = 1 (K X( ))+ " (where " > 0); (ii) types [ ; 0 ] separate with a hoarding level w ( ) > w P de…ned by (10) , and where 0 is implicitly de…ned by
Note that for all types > 0 , the RHS of expression (A.28) would be larger than its LHS. Furthermore, conditions 1)-5) are satis…ed now by construction for all equilibrium hoarding levels. Thus, together with single crossing (Lemma A.1), no type would …nd it optimal to deviate to the equilibrium hoarding strategy of a di¤erent type. (iii) Assuming that the …nancier places probability one on the deviation coming from the lowest type if the hoarding choice is di¤erent from w P [ [w ( 0 ) ; w ( )] guarantees that there are also no deviations to o¤-equilibrium hoarding strategies. Thus, the equilibrium can be supported, and it features equilibrium hoarding levels that (weakly) decrease in the manager's type. By varying ", we obtain a continuum of semi-separating equilibria. Q.E.D.
Appendix B Supplementary Material B.1 Precautionary Hoarding
Assume that the time until the arrival of an investment opportunity follows an exponential distribution with parameter a . It holds:
Proposition B.1 The attractiveness of the …rm's investment opportunity has opposite implications for hoarding depending on whether hoarding occurs in anticipation of an investment opportunity or whether it leads to the delay of an investment opportunity that is already present. In the former case, the manager hoards cash (until the investment opportunity arrives or she has su¢ cient funds at hand) only if the pro…tability of the investment opportunity is su¢ ciently high. In the latter case, the manager follows the hoarding and investment policies set out in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition B.1. We only o¤er a sketch of the argument. To determine whether the manager should start hoarding, we have to compare the expected payo¤ from hoarding with paying out w 0 . Since the investment opportunity's expected payo¤ is increasing in , there is a threshold e , such that starting to hoard is optimal if > e . For completeness, we brie ‡y discuss the optimal hoarding strategy before the investment opportunity's arrival. Let w 0 denote the cash level that the manager has hoarded at the time of the arrival of the …rm's investment opportunity. The expected value of the investment opportunity upon its arrival, U (w 0 ; w ), is given by (5) , and it is strictly increasing and convex in w 0 for w 0 < K. This implies that the optimal hoarding level before arrival is w 0 K. To see this, suppose to a contradiction that the manager stops hoarding at w 0 < K and pays out w t w 0 . Doing so cannot be optimal if hoarding until w 0 is optimal. First, the probability of arrival is the same at every instant. Second, given that U is convex in w 0 , the marginal increase in U is higher for any additionally hoarded unit of cash. In contrast, paying out a unit of cash has the same value to the manager regardless of the previously hoarded amount. Hence, if hoarding dominates paying out for w t < w 0 < K, it is even more bene…cial for w t = w 0 , giving a contradiction. Hence, we must have that w 0 K. 27 Q.E.D.
B.2 Cash Hoarding when Delay Reduces Uncertainty
One of the results from Section 3.2 is that …rms that choose private …nancing delay investment less than …rms choosing public …nancing. We now show that this result is true even if delaying investment helps alleviate the uncertainty and disagreement about the project's fundamentals. As a simple modi…cation to our baseline model, suppose that after receiving her initial signal, the manager believes that the project's value is X ( ) with probability p 0 (rather than one) and zero otherwise. The …nancier disagrees, believing that the value is X ( ) with probability < p 0 and zero otherwise. Suppose further that before investing, the …rm has a chance of observing a second signal that reveals whether the investment opportunity's value is X ( ) or zero is correct with certainty and is veri…able to all. The time until such an event follows an exponential distribution with parameter e . If uncertainty disappears, the manager invests immediately if the project's value is X ( ) ; and her expected payo¤ is X ( ) K. If the project's value is zero, she abandons it and pays out w t . If there is no signal, the manager can choose between investing and cash hoarding as in the baseline model, but also to continue waiting to observe a signal. For this extension, we assume in analogy to Section 3 that if the manager invests before the second signal arrives, 27 Since the maximum value of is one, the term (1 ) X in (5) remains constant for w 0 K. Thus, the bene…t of hoarding more than K decreases in w 0 for w 0 K and there is a certain hoarding level w 0 K, beyond which the manager pays out all additionally generated cash above w 0 . the …nancier's monitoring and interference choice is E 2 f0; 1g and the manager's cost of interference are (1) with ! 1. We assume that there is no monitoring and interference in case of the second fully-revealing signal.
The existence of such second reason to delay does not change that delay is less attractive when the …rm's investment opportunity is better. If the manager uses delay also for hoarding, we obtain again that the manager delays and hoards less before investment, when choosing private …nancing. Hence, she is more likely to risk investing under uncertainty. By standard monotone comparative statics arguments, observe that @ 2 U @ b w@ < 0 implies that b w is decreasing in . Hence, as in our baseline model, …rms with better investment opportunities hoard less cash. Q.E.D.
